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Introduction:  Cost  consolidation  in  the  highly  fragmented  and  inefﬁcient  Greek  health  care
system  was  necessary.  However,  policies  introduced  were  partly  formed  in a  context  of
insufﬁcient  information.  Expenditure  data  from  a consumption  point  of  view were  lacking
and  the  depth  of the  political  and  structural  problems  was  of  unknown  magnitude  to the
supervisory  authorities.
Methods: Drawing  upon  relevant  literature  and  evidence  from  the newly  implemented
OECD  System  of  Health  Accounts,  the  paper  evaluates  the health  policy  responses  to the
economic  crisis  in  Greece.  The  discussion  and  recommendations  are  also of  interest  to  other
countries  where  data  sources  are  not  reliable  or decisions  are  based  on preliminary  data
and  projections.
Results:  Between  2009  and  2012,  across-the-board  cuts have  resulted  in a  decline  in  public
health  expenditure  for inpatient  care  by  8.6%, for  pharmaceuticals  by 42.3%  and  for outpa-
tient  care  by 34.6%.  Further  cuts  are  expected  from  the  ongoing  reforms  but  more  structural
changes are  needed.
Conclusion:  Cost-containment  was  not  well  targeted  and expenditure  cuts  were  not  always
addressed  to the real reasons  of  the  pre-crisis  cost  explosion.  Policy  responses  were
restricted  to quick and easy  ﬁscal  adjustment,  ignoring  the need  for substantial  structural
reforms  or  individuals’  right  to access  health  care  irrespective  of  their  ﬁnancial  capac-
ity.  Developing  appropriate  information  infrastructure,  restructuring  and  consolidating
the  hospital  sector  and  moving  toward  a  tax-based  national  health  insurance  could offer
valuable  beneﬁts  to the system.
© 2014  Elsevier  Ireland  Ltd.  This  is an  open  access  article  under  the  CC BY-NC-ND  license. IntroductionThe Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between
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Central Bank (ECB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF)
and the Greek Government required severe cuts in public
expenditure, painful across-the-board salary cuts to boost
competitiveness and serious tax hikes to collect revenue
[1]. In a Eurozone country like Greece, where devalua-
tion was not an option and reliance on the ECB to buy
government bonds not legislated, raising taxes and cut-
ting public expenditure were the only possible ﬁscal policy
tools, despite warnings that austerity measures can only
deepen economic slump [2,3]. A “fair” ﬁscal adjustment,
 BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
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however, could provide the double dividend of enhancing
the probability of success of the economic adjustment and
promoting social cohesion [4].
During 2005–2009, health expenditure increase alone
was responsible for 21% of the cumulative ﬁscal deﬁcit in
the Greek economy [5,6]. A sector consuming one-tenth of
GDP and causing one-ﬁfth of the national deﬁcit is an obvi-
ous candidate for reform, especially when it is a negative
outlier in most health system performance indicators [7].
Considering also that the ﬁnancial crisis was evolving into
a full-blown economic crisis, and potentially a health cri-
sis, health reforms were required to allow the system to
weather economic pressures with productivity gains and
satisfy need-based demand.
It appears, however, that the negotiations were con-
ducted among actors with different perceptions of the
situation they were trying to resolve. On one hand, it was
a problem of data availability, as there was no informa-
tion about the ﬁnancial ﬂows into the system or about the
ﬁnancial and economic performance of public health care
units. On the other, there was lack of knowledge, from the
Troika’s perspective, of the implicit rules under which the
Greek health system operated for decades and the depth
of political and structural problems inherited. Thus, there
is a question of how targeted and effective were the policy
responses to the economic crisis under these information
constraints. Data from the recently implemented OECD
System of Health Accounts (SHA) [6,8,9] allows an assess-
ment of the “prescription” mandated by the Troika.
2. Health expenditure revealed
When the negotiations for the Economic Adjustment
Program (EAP) started in 2010, the Troika was under the
impression that Greece was among the very big spenders
as EUROSTAT and OECD reported ﬁgures well in excess of
10% of GDP as far back as 2005 [10]. Health expenditure
data were not issued by the Greek Statistical Service in
2009 and were replaced by OECD estimates for 2010 based
on previous data of dubious quality.1 At the same time,
analysis of health expenditure by activity, lacking a SHA,
was not available and meaningful analysis was  therefore
impossible.
As shown in Fig. 1, Total Current Health Expendi-
ture (TCHE) in Greece before 2005 was slightly over the
Eurozone average.2 There was also signiﬁcant reliance on
out-of-pocket payments3 as General Government Current
Health Expenditure, including Social Security, (GGCHE)
was more than one percentage point lower that the Euro-
zone average. Between 2005 and 2009, when GDP rose
by 19.7% (from D 193bn to D 231.1bn), TCHE increased
by 41.5% (from D 16.4bn to D 23.2bn) and GGCHE by 66%
(from D 9.7bn to D 16.1bn), a performance unparalleled by
any other sector with signiﬁcant public activity. Figures
1 OECD data for the years 2009–2011 have now been updated based on
the SHA. For 2012 preliminary data are available.
2 Average values were based on the following Eurozone countries:
Austria, Belgium, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Lux-
emburg, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain.
3 Consisting 94.3% of private payments. 117 (2014) 279–284
on TCHE and GGCHE by function of care—inpatient, phar-
maceutical, outpatient and other services—that are used
throughout the paper are shown in Table 1.
Out of the total D 38.1bn added to the public debt from
2005 to 2009, which was  the all-time peak year for both
health expenditure (10% of GDP) and ﬁscal deﬁcit (15.6% of
GDP), D 6.4bn (or 16.8%) was  an increase in public expen-
diture for health. This increase was different from the one
observed in most Eurozone countries during 2008–2009 as
a countercyclical response to the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008. In
2012, the GDP of Greece was  almost back to 2005 levels.
Likewise, during 2009–2012 TCHE and GGCHE decreased
by 24.1% and 25.5% respectively. Horizontal cuts imposed
by the MoU  resulted in a decrease of total inpatient expen-
diture by 3.5%, pharmaceutical by 30.8% and outpatient
expenditure by 42.4% (Table 1). In Greece, unlike most of
the Eurozone countries where the level of health expendi-
ture was  maintained, health care became part of the ﬁscal
adjustment.
3. The true factors behind the increase of public
health expenditure
The factors behind the signiﬁcant increase (66%) of
public health expenditure during the “bubble” years of
2005–2009 are aligned to the way health policy evolved
until then and the reasons that brought Greece to the edge
of ﬁnancial collapse. A careful consideration of all health
reform attempts over the last 30 years reveals that key poli-
cies in all reforms were not implemented4 and important
priority areas were largely ignored.5 In addition, many of
the policies introduced were followed by signiﬁcant unin-
tended consequences for the beneﬁt of the private sector
[12] or led to a signiﬁcant fragmentation of the system [13].
Imitating clientelistic practices of the wider political
economy [14], the health system evolved in a context of
patronage and favoritism [12,15–17]. In the absence of
policy planning and learning from past failures, beneﬁts
forgone in resource allocation decisions have constantly
been valued on the basis of political and private interest.
Between 2005 and 2009, the conservative party tried to
reform the administrative framework of the system (Laws
3329/05 and 3370/05), the pharmaceutical market (Law
3457/06), the hospital procurement model (Law 3580/07)
and the employment terms of hospital doctors in the pub-
lic sector (Law 3754/09). In a country, however, where
political success is only “measured” in terms of the ability
to maintain and support status quo, the economic conse-
quences of these policies, as evidenced in the following
section, were disastrous. The funds wasted during thesesubsequently axed due to the economic crisis. The depth to
which cronyism permeated all echelons of the system and
4 Such policies include the uniﬁcation of sickness funds, development
of  primary care, changes in hospital ﬁnancing methods, administrative
decentralization and reforms in physicians’ employment status.
5 Priority areas were the development of an SHA, stimulation of the
off-patent competition, rationalization of the number and composition of
physicians, development of monitoring mechanisms of the quality and
efﬁciency as well as a health technology assessment.
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ources: OECD Health Data, 2013 [11]; Center for Health Services Manage
ociety as well as the depth of the political and structural
roblems inherited by decades of neglect in health policy
lanning were unknown to the Troika.
. Evaluating the health policy responses to the
conomic crisis
The System of Health Accounts, proposed by the OECD,
as ﬁrst applied in 2003. Greece was the last among
5 countries to adopt it in 2012. The SHA allows for a
systematic description of the ﬁnancial ﬂows related to the
onsumption of health care goods and services” [18]. In the
bsence of a developed SHA in Greece, limited or no ofﬁcial
ata were available on the decomposition of health expen-
iture by type of health care services, by ﬁnancing agent
nd by provider. Using new evidence from the SHA, this sec-
ion evaluates the policy measures introduced after the ﬁrst
conomic Adjustment Program (EAP) in the main functions
f health care—inpatient, outpatient and pharmaceutical.
able 1
ublic and Private Health Expenditure by Function of Care (2003–2012), in billion
Year Inpatient curative Pharmaceutical and other
medical non-durables
Public Private Public Private 
Billion D % Billion D % Billion D % Billion D % 
2003 4.3 29.2 1.1 7.1 2.2 14.9 1.0 6.8 
2004 4.5 28.3 1.2 7.5 2.5 15.7 1.1 6.9 
2005 4.3 26.2 1.2 7.3 3.0 18.3 1.1 6.7 
2006 4.8 26.7 1.3 7.2 3.6 20.0 1.2 6.7 
2007 5.9 28.8 1.4 6.8 4.2 20.5 1.3 6.3 
2008 6.5 29.7 1.4 6.4 4.6 21.0 1.4 6.4 
2009 7.0 30.2 1.5 6.5 5.2 22.4 1.3 5.6 
2010 6.0 28.8 1.6 7.7 4.6 22.1 1.4 6.7 
2011  6.3 31.5 1.7 8.5 4.0 20.0 1.4 7.0 
2012  6.4 36.4 1.8 10.2 3.0 17.0 1.5 8.5 
ources: Center for Health Services Management and Evaluation, University of Atnt Health Expenditure (GGCHE) in Greece and the Eurozone, 2003–2012
d Evaluation, University of Athens, 2014 [6,8]; ELSTAT, 2014 [9].
4.1. Inpatient expenditure (hospital and inpatient
pharmaceutical)
During the negotiations for the ﬁrst EAP, apart from the
absence of a SHA, there were also no systematically col-
lected economic and ﬁnancial data for public health care
units that could inform decision making. It was  not until
February 2011 that such a system would become avail-
able as a prerequisite of the MoU. There was, however,
scattered evidence in academic literature and the national
press highlighting the level of waste in inpatient expendi-
ture. Indicative is a study published in 2010 reporting that
30–40% of non-salary cost in public hospitals was waste
due to the fragmented and outdated procurement system.
This was  responsible for a 47% increase of inpatient phar-
maceutical expenditure during 2005–2008 and 300–500%
higher prices for medical supplies compared to Northern
Europe [19]. Considering that there were no ﬁnancial or
other efﬁciency incentives for hospitals and physicians,




Public Private Public Private
Billion D % Billion D % Billion D % Billion D %
1.5 10.2 3.8 25.8 0.7 4.7 0.2 1.4
1.6 10.1 4.0 25.2 0.8 5.0 0.2 1.3
1.6 9.8 4.1 25.0 0.8 4.9 0.3 1.8
1.8 10.0 4.2 23.3 0.9 5.0 0.2 1.1
2.0 9.8 4.3 21.0 1.1 5.4 0.3 1.5
2.3 10.5 4.3 19.6 1.1 5.0 0.3 1.4
2.6 11.2 4.0 17.2 1.3 5.6 0.3 1.3
2.3 11.1 3.4 16.3 1.2 5.8 0.3 1.4
2.2 11.0 3.0 15.0 1.2 6.0 0.2 1.0
1.7 9.7 2.1 11.9 0.9 5.1 0.2 1.1
hens, 2014 [6,8]; ELSTAT, 2014 [9].
lth Policy282 I. Goranitis et al. / Hea
soaring hospital budget deﬁcits were reimbursed by the
government. In a review of the Greek health care system
published in 2010, the author reports that in 2007 hospital
debts were D 2.8bn despite policy attempts to curb them
[20].
Due to the excessive level of waste in inpatient expen-
diture, cost consolidation in public hospitals could result in
signiﬁcant savings without harming the quality of care pro-
vided and patients’ access to health care services. According
to the SHA data, public expenditure for inpatient services,
which accounts for almost half of public health expen-
diture, rose by 62.8% during 2005–2009, increasing from
D 4.3bn to D 7bn. The salary bill for public hospitals, which
had increased by 17% between 2003 and 2008, had a fur-
ther 15% increase peaking at D 3.1bn in 2010. A possible
explanation of this signiﬁcant increase in the wage bill is
the promotion in 2008 of all associate directors to the grade
of director with considerable salary and related overtime
payment rises.6
The policy responses according to the EAP included
rationalization of hospital procurement of health technolo-
gies through central tendering, a gradual move toward
a DRG-based reimbursement method for hospitals and
across-the-board salary cuts. Early evidence in the procure-
ment of pharmaceuticals and medical supplies indicates
signiﬁcant cost savings [21]. However, the effective imple-
mentation of the DRG system is still an ongoing process
[22] and centralized electronic procurement and utiliza-
tion control are only now approaching full implementation
[16].
The search for immediate efﬁciency gains in the form
of expenditure cuts was  limited to the “easy” solution of
across-the-board cuts in medicines and supplies. These
resulted in 8.6% reduction of inpatient curative expendi-
ture, from D 7bn in 2009 to D 6.4bn in 2012 and a 39.2%
decrease of hospital pharmaceutical expenditure from
D 1.25bn to D 0.76bn. However, shortages in medicines [23]
and disruptions in the provision of health care, in surgeries
for example [24], have also been reported. Similarly, hor-
izontal salary cuts in health professionals were imposed
without considering the composition of managerial and
health professionals and their remuneration with devastat-
ing effects for nursing personnel [25].7 Instead, important
policies, such as reorganization and merging of hospitals or
changes in management practices, have been overlooked
due to the political cost.
4.2. Outpatient expenditure
Another function of care for which reliable eco-
nomic or utilization data were unavailable during the
negotiations with the Troika was outpatient care. The
academic literature, however, had repeatedly reported
6 The then Minister gave an “electoral” bonus to the close-to-retirement
upper tier of hospital doctors, at a huge cost and also disrupting the line
of  command in all clinical departments.
7 In 2009, Greece had the lowest number of nurses per thousand popu-
lation in Eurozone (3.3 with OECD average at 8.4) and their remuneration
was  again among the lowest. In 2014, a strong tendency to emigrate is
already noted. 117 (2014) 279–284
signiﬁcant fragmentation in primary health care,8 its great
dependence on the private sector, often leading to supplier-
induced demand, and its disconnect from secondary and
tertiary care, which poses a signiﬁcant burden to hospitals
[20]. Furthermore, ﬁnancing of certain ambulatory ser-
vices, like dental care, relied almost solely on out-of-pocket
payments.
After 2010, in a context where public outpatient expen-
diture was of unknown magnitude but certainly low and,
unable to yield signiﬁcant cost-savings, the Greek govern-
ment, at the instigation of the Troika, saw ambulatory care
as a means to raise revenue through cost-sharing arrange-
ments. Fees to outpatient departments of public hospitals
increased from D 3 to D 5 and were planned to rise fur-
ther to D 25. The law was withdrawn immediately after
implementation due to widespread opposition, in the face
of the burden salary cuts and tax hikes had already imposed
on household budgets and the ailing social protection net-
work. In addition, the introduction of afternoon outpatient
clinics to public hospitals came at a cost ranging from D 30
to D 90 depending on physician’s grade, soon to be reduced
to D 25–D 72. The most substantial policy reform, which
had constantly been failing over the last 30 years, was  the
uniﬁcation of the biggest Social Insurance funds.
According to the Greek SHA, the increase in health
expenditure during 2003–2009 was  also reﬂected in
outpatient expenditure. This increase, however, was prob-
lematic, as households were contributing throughout this
period 65–75% of the total D 5.3–D 6.5bn spent on outpa-
tient care. From 2009 and onwards, the already negligible
contribution of Social Insurance and Government to pri-
mary care expenditure was  further affected by horizontal
cuts imposed by the MoU, totaling a 34.6% decline. How-
ever, a more careful interpretation of this trend is needed.
Between 2009 and 2012, outpatient expenditure decreased
by D 2.8bn, 67.9% of which was a decrease in out-of-pocket
payments. That possibly implies that individuals delay or
forgo the use of primary care services because of its increas-
ing cost and the impact of the economic crisis to household
budgets. This is supported by evidence from the 2011 Min-
istry of Health Report [26] reporting a 10.8% decrease in
the number of visits to outpatient hospital departments, a
change not compensated by an increase in the demand for
private sector services.
Outpatient and preventive care could play an important
role during the economic crisis protecting the population
from the negative health effects of unemployment and eco-
nomic distress and insuring that immediate health needs
would not be forgone due to ﬁnancial difﬁculties. Instead
of ensuring and facilitating access to primary care, the gov-
ernment used it to raise revenues. Policies that should have
been in the center of policy agenda since 2010 are only now
being introduced. Free access to primary care for the unin-
sured that meet certain income criteria was  implemented
in September of 2013 and the reform of primary health care
to standards resembling those of the British NHS passed
Parliament in February of 2014. It was  only in June 2014,
8 Which at the time was  delivered through four different structures:
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hat full coverage to the uninsured was extended to hospi-
al and pharmaceutical care.
.3. Pharmaceutical expenditure (outpatient)
Unlike inpatient and outpatient expenditure, for which
o ofﬁcial data were available before the ﬁrst EAP, ﬁg-
res for pharmaceutical expenditure were reported by
he OECD. Therefore, the level of public pharmaceutical
xpenditure and its driving factors were already known.
ccording to the OECD [7], in 2009, Greece was  ﬁrst in
he Eurozone in per capita pharmaceutical expenditure
D 677)9 and its annual average growth rate since 2000
11.1%). Public pharmaceutical expenditure, as a percent-
ge of GDP, and consumption of antibiotics were also the
argest. In addition, high prices for generics, set at 90% of
riginators’ price, lack of policies to encourage generic pre-
cribing and dispensing as well as physicians’ brand loyalty,
reated limited incentives for generic penetration into the
arket.
Despite the absence of accurate data, evidence pointed
oward the potential for ﬁscal consolidation through
ncreasing generic and off-patent market competition and
ppropriate ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial incentives to physi-
ians and pharmacists. A 20% reduction to the prices of
harmaceuticals, prior to the ﬁrst EAP, and further price
uts to generic and off-patent drugs as well as a reduction
o the mark-ups for wholesalers and pharmacies post-
AP, were the main cost-containing policies introduced
y the Greek government. A recent paper evaluating the
harmaceutical reforms during the economic crisis [27],
cknowledged that policies that could yield immediate
conomic beneﬁt, like tendering for outpatient pharma-
euticals, were not considered, while internal reference
ricing, which aimed to be the main governmental policy,
as later dropped. Similarly, policies that could encourage
rescription and consumption of generics, like prescribing
y international nonproprietary names and generic substi-
ution, were not implemented until 2012 and in a way that
id not guarantee their effectiveness.10
As the data from the SHA comes in, it is evident
hat during 2005–2009 public pharmaceutical expenditure
ncreased by 73.3%, from D 3bn to D 5.2bn. The importance
f the very fast increase and the level of public health
xpenditure, however, had been underestimated by the
roika experts involved in the negotiations. According to
 major EU study [28], TCHE for the year 2010 was approx-
mated at 10.5% of GDP,11 of which 17.1% (D 4bn) was  public
harmaceutical expenditure. With the SHA ﬁgures, how-
ver, it is evident that public pharmaceutical expenditure
as, for the same year, D 600m more than estimated, as
reece was spending 9.4% of GDP on TCHE, 22.5% of which
as public pharmaceutical expenditure. Between 2010
9 This ﬁgure was  available prior the implementation of the SHA in
reece.
10 Physicians were allowed to suggest a particular branded drug in their
rescription and there were no ﬁnancial incentives to pharmacists for
eneric substitution.
11 The ﬁfth highest ﬁgure among the 27 EU countries included in the
nalysis. 117 (2014) 279–284 283
and 2012, public pharmaceutical expenditure decreased
by 34.8% (from D 4.6bn to D 3bn) indicating that the lack
of dependable health expenditure statistics would have
made both sides involved in the debate much more care-
ful in identifying the sources of waste and more decisive in
introducing policies to control it.
5. Discussion
In the ﬁve years from the onset of the crisis, the Greek
health sector has shed a substantial part of unnecessary
expenditure. Cuts in pharmaceutical prices, hospital costs
and bogus payments for unneeded care have cut more
than 24% of total health expenditure. However, evidence
suggests that this reduction was  not targeted and that
expenditure cuts were not all addressed to the real reasons
of the pre-crisis cost explosion. Policy responses were only
focused on quick and easy ﬁscal adjustment, ignoring the
need for structural reforms or individuals’ right to access
health care irrespective of their ability to pay.
Designing targeted, comprehensive, and effective
health policies certainly depends on data availability,
which in the case of Greece was  limited. Health policy
responses during the economic crisis should be judged
bearing this in mind, but given the evidence presented,
more efﬁcient and equitable structural reforms could have
been initiated. This can be a lesson for future policy inter-
ventions, especially in countries where data sources are not
always reliable, or where decisions are based on prelimi-
nary data or projections. It is true that certain measures,
such as e-prescribing and e-monitoring, have been suc-
cessful in cutting excess and even fraudulent prescribing.
Further progress is expected from the policies now being
implemented. However, there are other policies that are
also of higher importance.
The main direction in which health policy should be
moving toward is the revamping of ﬁnancing away from
employment contributions-based social insurance, to tax-
based National Health Insurance. Unemployment currently
at 27% is not expected to drop signiﬁcantly for many years,
making employer–employee contributions an inadequate
base for health insurance. Another major area is hospi-
tal restructuring and consolidation. A study outlining the
main areas of this restructuring was presented by the
Health Minister in May  2011,12 but it is only now being
tried and only in the Athens area. One of the main pro-
posals in the study was the creation of Emergency and
Accident Units operating on a 24/7 basis in main hospi-
tals. Emergency care is perhaps the main “dark hole” in
the Greek health system, resulting even in deaths when
necessary care is not available at the critical time and
place.13
In addition, the “convenient” lack of economic and
ﬁnancial data in health care seems to have come to an end.
Greece, however, should insist on further reform as infor-
mation about clinical quality is still lacking. Clinical process
12 http://platon.cc.uoa.gr/ reconweb/new2/.
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and outcomes measurement could offer substantial
beneﬁts to the health care system. Patients could make
informed decisions about their treatment pathway, which
also provides an indirect way of driving quality in health
care [29] and clinical practitioners could also be informed
about their performance [30]. Such information would also
offer better value for money as, on one hand, it would
enable the assessment of hospitals’ and providers’ per-
formance and on the other to design advanced payment
methods, like pay-for-performance, or implement ﬁnan-
cial and non-ﬁnancial incentives [31]. A ﬁrst step in that
direction could be the implementation of a central database
providing record linkage of patients admitted to inpatient
and outpatient services. Such a policy would allow the
study of the complex relationship between patient out-
comes and health care utilization.
There is still a long way to go to transform the Greek
health system into an efﬁcient, equitable and sustain-
able system. This transformation, however, needs to be
directed by transparent and evidence-based decisions. Cre-
ating the appropriate information-related infrastructure,
such as HTA, Socio-Economic Evaluation, Quality Measure-
ment and Patient Satisfaction as well as Empowerment
Guidelines will assist consumers, clinicians and policy-
makers in a wide range of decisions. Perhaps, the tragedy
of the economic crisis will prove to have at least one
“silver lining” allowing for a better health system in the
future.
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